The transfer of power has become a major problem in Nepali politics. It has demoralized politics, fueled economic recklessness, and increased unnecessary burden to the people and the country. Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba has continued that culture. It must be changed.
Have you ever given away something you love voluntarily? Have you ever given up your power at home or in office? I can tell you from my experience that it is incredibly difficult. Some people stick to power and position forever, going to any extent.
Therefore, democratic societies stipulate specific period and procedure for tranfering power. Some countries have made them more specific than others. For instance, the United States holds its elections on Tuesday after 1 November and requires the transfer of power on 20 January.
Nepal’s constitution lacks such specificities. Therefore, Mr. Deuba has been exploiting the loophole while promising to resign after the elections are finished. I can understand Mr. Deuba’s stand. The federal upper house, indeed, is yet to be elected and obtain its full shape.
However, Mr. Deuba stands on a shaky ground. Even if he had resigned a month ago, he would have continued as the interim prime minister. Mr. Deuba is too smart not to understand it. Then, why has Mr. Deuba not yet resigned resign? While no one can read his mind, we can rationally speculate a range of motivations behind his procrastination.
First, Mr. Deuba expects to become prime minister again during the life of the recently elected federal house of representative if he can break the CPN (UML)-Maoist Center alliance. A coalition of his party, the Maoist Center, the Federal Socialist Forum, and the Rashtriya Janata Party will constitute a majority in the house. Therefore, Mr. Deuba thrown a bait to the Maoist Center leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal by supporting him for prime minister for the next five years. If Mr. Dahal takes the bait, if would be the eighth wonder if Mr. Deuba did not ask him for a roatation and become prime minister again.
Second, Mr. Deuba has already reaped the benefits by not resigning. If he had resigned, he could not have forced President Bidya Devi Bhandari to sign the upper house election ordinance, which incorporates his choice, the single transferable vote system, not the first-past-the-post favored by the UML. Under the measure, his party will have a respectable representation in the upper house, otherwise impossible. Mr. Deuba might also be able to wangle one or two members to be nominated to it by President Bhandari.
Third, Mr. Deuba has already appointed governors and chief secretaries in the provinces the people of his choice. While there is no guarantee that the government waiting in the wing would keep them all in their positions, some of them may survive, which would be a major gain for Mr. Deuba’s party, which has not won a majority in any of the seven states.
Fourth, Mr. Deuba, by sticking to power, could announce several populist programs on the fly, without costing them. For instance, he has reduced the eligibility age for the old-age pension from 70 to 65 and for the single or widowed Dalit women to 55. In addition, he has been spending money from the state coffers to reward his cronies, friends, and supporters in one pretext or another. Even the Finance Ministry and Home Ministry have expressed their concerns about Mr. Deuba’s reckless populism.
However, the left alliance (UML-Maoist Center) is not free from its own shortcomings that have allowed Mr. Deuba to continue in power and take these reckless populist measures. Even though the alliance members have agreed on power-sharing in six states where they would form the government, they are yet to agree on it at the center.
This is not the first time a prime minister has clung to power even though he has lost the majority. Prime Ministers Girija Koirala in 1994 and Man Mohan Adhikari in 1995 dissolved the house and called elections, so they stayed in power until the election as interim. When he lost the majority, Mr. Deuba did the same in 2002, though he knew he could not organize the vote owing to Maoist disturbances.
After the 2008 elections, Prime Minister Girija Koirala showed no signs of quitting from April to September. Prime Minister Sushil Koirala clung to power by breaking his agreement with the UML until it became untenable for him to do so on the face of the Indian economic embargo and opposition from the UML. K.P. Oli waited for a no-confidence motion to mature and resigned on the eve of the motion hitting the house floor.
Such examples demonstrate that they occur frequently. To prevent such maneuvering and resulting damage to democracy and the treasury, Nepal should introduce specific dates for the election and transfer of power. If the specificity of the United States is impossible to follow for one reason or another, it out to be a limited timefame, so it would not be stretched as an elastic.
We lock our doors to prevent the well-meaning people to be tempted to steal. Similarly, we should put in place rules for checks and balances, so well-meaning politicians would not be tempted to stretch their power as an elastic. Firm rules and strong institutions are the locks of democratic politics that help secure our democracy and freedoms.